Executive
Summary
Since 2 March 2026, Israel and Lebanon have been witnessing a rapid
escalation marked by widespread evacuation orders, intensified airstrikes, and
the spillover of the effects of the fighting into urban areas. This context has
generated massive waves of internal displacement in Lebanon, with data from the
Lebanese government's Disaster Risk Management Unit indicating that the number
of registered IDPs reached 816,700 as of 11 March 2026, including 125,800
people residing in 590 collective shelters, while the rest were distributed to
relatives' homes or temporary housing. This displacement occurred less than ten
days after the start of the escalation, exacerbating the fragility of the
service infrastructure and the already limited government capacity, and putting
severe pressure on the system of shelters, schools, and public services in
various regions of Lebanon[1].
Within this crisis, the displacement of Palestinian refugees
(including Palestinians displaced from Syria) emerges as a form of
"displacement within displacement", with Palestinian families moving
from camps in the south and Beirut to camps in the north or to UNRWA-run
shelters or public buildings, with a clear overlap between Palestinian
displacement and Lebanese and Syrian displacement to or from[2]camps.
The most prominent figures available as of 14 March 2026 indicate
that 1,567 displaced Palestinians (436 families) were registered in emergency
shelters run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees (UNRWA) in Lebanon as of about 10 March, distributed at a centre in
Siblin/a nearby school complex in the vicinity of Sidon and a Battir school in
northern Lebanon. A total of 290 families (1,015 individuals) have been
displaced from Tyre camps (Rashidiya, Burj al-Shamali and al-Bass) to shelters
since 2 March. In addition, 52 Palestinian families (201 individuals) have
moved from Beirut to the Dbayeh and Mar Elias camps since the beginning of the
escalation.
At the same time, the northern camps received additional waves of
displacement outside the official shelter system, as 350 Palestinian families
arrived in Nahr al-Bared camp coming from Beirut and the south, according to
the statistics of the popular committees in the camp, and 230 Palestinian
families arrived in Beddawi camp, with indications of a relief gap and a delay
in opening facilities and schools to house the new arrivals. Palestinians from
Syria, as well as Lebanese, Syrian and Egyptian families. The data indicates
that 372 children, 26 elderly people and 17 people with disabilities are among
the total arrivals, reflecting the concentration of needs among the most
vulnerable groups.[3]
The main risks to IDPs stem from several interrelated factors,
including limited safe housing options, high rents and overcrowding within
camps, the decline of some of UNRWA's essential health, education and waste
collection services in the affected areas, as well as the increasing pressure
on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services within camps and shelters.
Challenges related to social and psychological protection, including trauma,
gender-based violence risks and child protection in overcrowded environments,
are also exacerbated. The chronic legal and structural constraints faced by
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in the areas of employment, property, and
social security, as well as the immediate security risks associated with
shelling, eviction orders, and field reports on the use of weapons with
dangerous humanitarian implications in some of the affected areas[4].
Framework,
Context and Data Methodology
The definition
of "Displaced Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon" in this report:
The report
includes two main categories:
1.Palestinian
refugees residing in Lebanon (historically registered with the Lebanese State
and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees
(UNRWA), residing in Palestinian camps or communities).
2.Palestinians
from Syria in Lebanon (Palestinian refugees who have been displaced from Syria
to Lebanon since the outbreak of the Syriancrisis), given their appearance in the current displacement flows, as
shown in the arrival data of some camps, including the presence of 6 families of Syrian Palestinians among
those arriving in Rashidieh camp during the recent waves of displacement.
Time Point:
The report adopts a time reference point of 14 March 2026 (Asia
Time/Beirut). Given the dynamic nature of the crisis, figures on IDPs, victims
or shelters remain changing daily, so the data in this report are presented in
the form of snapshots or estimated ranges with reference to the level of
confidence in the source whenever possible[5].
Data Collection
and Verification Methodology:
The report relied primarily on local sources specialized in
following up on the conditions of the Palestinian camps, especially the
"Sada Diaspora" platform, as it monitors the developments of
displacement within the camps on the ground and documents the movements of
families and the needs of vulnerable groups in cooperation with local popular
committees.
In parallel, credible UN and humanitarian sources have been
employed to assess the overall context of displacement and developments in the
humanitarian situation in Lebanon, including the UNHCR Flash Update, the United Nations Children's
Fund (UNICEF) updates, as well as data and reports from the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as ICRC assessments of the humanitarian situation
and basic services in areas of displacement[6].
In the legal and human rights aspect, the report was based on
materials and analysis issued by the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee on
the legal framework for the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, as
well as Human Rights Watch reports documenting the legal constraints and
historical discrimination faced by Palestinian refugees in the areas of
employment, property, and social security, and the direct impact this has on
their resilience during crises and[7]conflicts.
To determine the population baseline of Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon, the report relied on the results of the "General Census of Population and
Housing in Palestinian Camps and Communities in Lebanon 2017" issued by
the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee in cooperation with the Lebanese
Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,
as the most detailed official statistical reference at the level of Palestinian
camps and communities[8].
A note about
accessing sources:
Some of the official UNRWA pages were not directly accessible
during the verification process due to technical access restrictions (Error
403), and in some cases local and specialized sources were relied upon to
transmit UNRWA data, treated as secondary sources of the Agency's data, and a
higher degree of caution in assessing the level of confidence in the use of
such data.
Size,
demographics, and geographical distribution
Understanding
the patterns of Palestinian refugee displacement during the current crisis
depends on two analytical levels:
(a) Population
baseline prior to the current crisis
(b)
Displacement and population movements since 2 March 2026
Population
baseline according to official census
The General Census of Population and Housing in Palestinian Camps
and Communities in Lebanon (2017) showed that the total adjusted number of
Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon amounted to 174,422 individuals. The
census also showed that 50.4% of the population is male and 49.6% are female,
and that the average family size is 4 members, while female-headed households
constitute about 17.2% of all Palestinian households in Lebanon[9].
The General Census of Population and Housing in Palestinian Camps
and Communities in Lebanon (2017) also shows that the geographical distribution
of Palestinian refugees within the camps and communities included in the study
tends to be concentrated in the Sidon region (35.8%), followed by the northern
region (25.1%), then the Tyre region (14.7%), the Peruvian region (13.4%), the
Chouf (7.1%), and the Bekaa (4.0%). This
distribution is an important factor in understanding current displacement
trajectories, as the southern and Sidon regions – home to the largest
concentrations of Palestinian refugees – have been among the areas most
affected by the recent military escalation.[10]
Comparison of
Camps by Population and Composition of Nationalities (2017)
The 2017 General Census of Population and Housing in Palestinian
Camps and Communities in Lebanon provides an important demographic baseline for
understanding the reality of Palestinian camps prior to the current war. Its
data show that a number of camps no longer include not only Palestinian
refugees residing in Lebanon, but also Palestinians displaced from Syria, as
well as Lebanese, Syrians, and others within the camps[11].
In Burj al-Barajneh camp, the total population within the camp was
18,351 people, including 8,219 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 687 displaced
Palestinians from Syria, 529 Lebanese, 8,790 Syrians, and 126 other groups. The
total population of the 1000 camp was 2,359 people, including 1,935 Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and 253 Palestinians displaced from Syria. In Burj
al-Shamali camp, the total number of people was 10,218, including 8,142 Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and 1. 444 Palestinians displaced from Syria. Shatila camp
has a total population of 14,010, including 4,156 Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon and 537 Palestinians displaced from Syria, as well as 1,155 Lebanese
and 8,064 Syrians, making it one of the most mixed[12]camps in terms of demographics.
In Dbayeh camp, the total population was 1,772, including 758 Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon. In Ein al-Hilweh camp, the largest of the Palestinian
camps in Lebanon, the total population was 21,209, including 18,763 Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and 1,523 Palestinians displaced from Syria. The total
population of Mar Elias camp was 1,767, including 748 Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon and 55 Palestinians displaced from Syria. In Rashidieh camp, the total
number was 9,656, of which 8,641 were Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 560
were A Palestinian displaced from Syria.
Nahr el-Bared camp has a total population of 9,470, including 8,091 Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and 1,015 Palestinians displaced from Syria. In Wefel camp,
a total of 2,165 people were killed, including 1,421 Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon and 626 Palestinians displaced from Syria. The total population of
Beddawi camp is 17,995, including 9,740 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and
1,367 Palestinians displaced from Syria, along with 630 Lebanese and 6,193
Syrians. The total population of Al-Buss camp was 5,234, including 4,073 Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and 412 Palestinians displaced from Syria.
These data reveal that a number of camps, notably Burj al-Barajneh,
Shatila and Beddawi, before the current war had large non-Palestinian
population blocs, which means that any new displacement to or from these camps
will quickly hit the limits of the capacity to absorb services and
infrastructure, and that the humanitarian and security pressure during the war
does not affect Palestinians alone inside the camps.[13]
Palestinian
displacement documented since 2 March 2026
As of 14 March 2026, there is no unified dashboard that compiles
all patterns of Palestinian displacement in Lebanon, whether within or between
camps, to public shelters or to rented accommodation. However, an initial
operational picture can be built across four main baskets: the first is the
presence of 1,567 displaced Palestinians (436 families) inside UNRWA shelters
as of about 10 March, the displacement of 290 families (1,015 individuals) from
the Rashidieh, Burj al-Shamali and Al-Bass camps to shelters, and the third is
the relocation of 290 families (1,015 individuals) from the Rashidieh, Burj
al-Shamali and Al-Bas camps to the shelters 52 families (201 individuals) from
Beirut to Dbayeh and Mar Elias camps, while the fourth basket is represented in
displacement and reception between camps outside the framework of official
shelters, where 350 families arrived in Nahr el-Bared and 230 families to
Beddawi, according to the statistics of the popular committees.
In terms of confidence level, the figures for IDPs within shelters
appear to be of high to moderate confidence because they are based on an
organized record, although they are transmitted through intermediate sources.
The figures of the popular committees regarding the arrival of 350 and 230
families in Nahr el-Bared and Beddawi camps are moderately reliable, strong on
the ground but susceptible to rapid change or duplication, and do not always
include an accurate count of individuals. In contrast, the broader distribution
of displacement to and from the camps of Beirut, Sidon and the Bekaa remains to
be estimated Low to medium confidence due to the lack of comprehensive and
up-to-date digital coverage. This analytical estimate is based on the
multiplicity of field monitoring sources and the absence of a unified and
up-to-date dashboard of Palestinian displacement between camps until 14 March
2026[14].
The Path of
Displacement Since the Outbreak of the War
The trajectory of Palestinian refugee displacement in Lebanon
during the March 2026 escalation can be traced by linking Palestinian
population movements to the broader context of internal displacement in the
country. The first wave began with the expansion of airstrikes and eviction
orders since 2 March 2026, accompanied by widespread disruption of education
and the opening of hundreds of public shelters, with tens of thousands of
displaced people registered in the first days alone. Humanitarian updates show
that school closures and the conversion of schools into shelters have been a
form of one from the outset Key determinants of the subsequent displacement
trajectory, including for Palestinian refugees who have had to move between
camps or resort to temporary shelter arrangements.[15]
As the scope of operations expanded, UNRWA's response began to take
on a more visible practical character, with the opening of shelter facilities
in Siblin and the vicinity of Sidon, and early indications emerged that
Palestinian displacement was shifting from a localized displacement from the
south and Beirut to a multi-directional displacement, which also included camps
in the north. In this context, 5 March and 6 March emerged as hotspots, with
threats escalating in the vicinity of Beirut and the suburbs, and the influx of
Palestinian families into Nahr el-Bared, where 350 Palestinian families arrived
Data of the popular committees in the camp[16].
By 8 March 2026, the picture was clearer in terms of documented
Palestinian displacement to shelters, with 342 Palestinian families (1,216
individuals) documenting the displacement of 342 Palestinian families (1,216
individuals), including 290 families (1,015 individuals) from the Rashidieh,
Burj al-Shamali and Al-Buss camps in the Tyre area, in addition to 52 families
(201 individuals) from Beirut to Dbayeh and Mar Elias camps. This phase shows
that Palestinian displacement has taken two parallel paths: The first is to formal or semi-official
shelters, and the second is to the Palestinian camps that are less at immediate
risk[17].
On 10 March, there were clear signs of pressure shifting towards
the northern camps, with 230 Palestinian families arriving in Beddawi camp, at
a time when UN reports were pointing to a rapid expansion of total displacement
in Lebanon. Then, on 11 March, Rashidieh received a mixed influx of 234
families (1,014 people), including 71 Palestinian families and 6 Syrian
Palestinian families, as well as vulnerable groups including large numbers of
children, the elderly, and people with disabilities[18].
As of March 12, 2026, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
has estimated the number of IDPs registered in Lebanon at 816,700, including
285,600 children, as severe pressure continues on schools used as shelters and
on basic services. On March 13, human rights warnings about the expansion of
eviction orders increased, while UN and media reports indicated that the number
of displaced people in Lebanon had exceeded 800,000 in less than two weeks of
escalation. This general context gives an explanatory dimension He explains
that the movements of Palestinian refugees were not isolated, but came within a
broad national wave of displacement, but took a more complex form due to the
fragility of the camps and the specificity of the refugees' legal and social
status[19].
Analytically, this timeline shows two major leaps in Palestinian
displacement: the first during the period from 2 to 8 March in the displacement
from the south/Tyre and Beirut to shelters and alternative camps; This also
coincides with the acceleration of the general displacement in Lebanon from
some 517,000 registered as of 8 March to 816,700 registered up to 816,700 March
12, with subsequent estimates that the number of displaced people will exceed
800,000 in the middle of the month, according to humanitarian updates issued by
the UN and Lebanese disaster management agencies.
Living
conditions, protection and access to services
Shelter and
overcrowding
Displacement patterns in Lebanon during the March 2026 escalation
show a range of predominant features that also apply to displaced Palestinians,
with additional peculiarities related to the nature of the camps and the legal
status of refugees. One of the most prominent features is the rapid relocation
in emergency conditions without the ability to transport basic goods or
property, as well as the increasing reliance on informal accommodation
arrangements such as accommodation with relatives or acquaintances, temporary
overnight stays in cars, or the use of unfinished buildings. This is due to
Mainly due to the rapid filling of collective shelters during the first days of
the military escalation and the expansion of internal displacement[20].
At the level of Palestinian camps specifically, three main types of
housing arrangements for IDPs can be observed. The first is accommodation with
relatives or acquaintances in the receiving camps, particularly in the northern
camps. In Beddawi camp, some 230 Palestinian expatriate families were divided
between staying with relatives in overcrowded houses or renting housing at
their own expense despite the difficult economic conditions in the camps.
The second type is the increasing pressure on the rental market
within the camps and the potential for economic exploitation that may accompany
it. In Nahr el-Bared camp, the popular committee in the camp called on
homeowners not to raise rents with the arrival of displaced families, which
reflects the sensitivity of the limited housing market within the camp and the
possibility of it turning into an economic pressure channel on displaced
families in light of the limited housing options available.
The third pattern is mixed overcrowding within some camps in the
south. Rashidieh camp has received an influx of 1,014 people of multiple
nationalities, including Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, and others,
increasing pressure on limited basic services within the camp and leading to
increased competition for basic resources such as housing, water, and health
services.
Water,
Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
UNICEF reports that the pressure on water, sanitation and
electricity services is increasing as the number of displaced people increases,
and that many families are staying in inadequate or unsafe places, which
increases health risks and calls for emergency interventions in the WASH sector
within shelters[21].
In a humanitarian update issued on 12 March 2026, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)
reported that its partners implemented emergency WASH interventions in 188
shelters across Lebanon, targeting some 11,200 families (approximately 46,000
people). These interventions included repairing sanitary facilities, installing
additional showers and latrines — including units for people with disabilities
— as well as distributing cleaning materials, water tanker transportation, and
removing sludge from shelter latrines to reduce the spread of COVID-19 One of
the health risks associated with overcrowding inside temporary shelters[22].
Inside the Palestinian camps, field indicators indicate a relative
deterioration in water, sanitation and hygiene services in a number of camps
located in the Tyre area. In Burj al-Shamali, Rashidiya and al-Buss camps, the
closure of some clinics and the disruption of waste collection services have
led to the accumulation of waste and the rise of health concerns in an already
densely populated environment and weak infrastructure for basic services.
Health
The World Health Organization (WHO) describes the health situation
in Lebanon as a rapidly deepening health crisis, with the military escalation
leading to the closure of dozens of primary health care centres and the
rendering of some hospitals out of service due to damage or evacuation orders,
increasing the need for emergency services and medical care.[23]
Overcrowding in shelters and poor access to water and sanitation
services increase the risk of the spread of respiratory and waterborne
diseases, especially among women and children, who make up a large proportion
of the displaced.
For Palestinian refugees, local reports indicate that the
suspension of some UNRWA primary health services in the southern areas has led
to an immediate gap in health care, leading many refugees to rely on private
pharmacies or local solidarity networks for treatment.
Education
At the national level, the transformation of public schools into
temporary shelters has led to a widespread disruption of the educational
process. As of 11 March 2026, 344 public schools were converted into shelters,
92% of which are fully full, hosting more than 58,000 displaced people. This
resulted in the disruption of the education of more than 72,000 students in the
morning shift and about 39,000 students in the evening shift in these schools,
reflecting the severe pressure on the educational infrastructure due to
internal displacement.[24]
As for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA reports indicate that since 2
March, the Agency's schools and vocational training centre have been closed in
line with the decision of the Lebanese Ministry of Education, resulting in a
temporary suspension of education for thousands of Palestinian students who
rely on these schools[25].
Livelihoods and
social protection
The population baseline in the 2017 Census of Palestinian Camps and
Communities in Lebanon reveals significant vulnerability in the labour market
for Palestinian refugees. The census showed that only 5.2% of Palestinian
workers had official work leave, reflecting the prevalence of informal work and
the absence of basic social protection tools such as compensation or health
insurance.
During the current crisis, this economic and social fragility is
further illustrated by reports on the ground indicating rising commodity and
fuel prices, the suspension of many daily and agricultural activities, and the
limited capacity of the camps to absorb new arrivals without organized external
support. This reality highlights the compounding pressure on Palestinian
refugees during the conflicts because of structural legal restrictions on the
right to work and social security in Lebanon.[26]
Protection
concerns
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, notes that high levels of fear,
anxiety and psychological stress among displaced people as a result of repeated
displacement, loss of shelter and uncertainty about the future are high,
stressing the need to put humanitarian protection at the heart of the emergency
response.[27]
UN human rights experts have warned that thousands of displaced
people, including children, have been forced to sleep in their cars or on the
roads, and that widespread eviction orders could lead to forced displacement
that may contravene international humanitarian law's provisions on the
protection of civilians during armed conflict[28].
In Rashidiya camp, the scale of the protection burden illustrates
the influx of 1,014 new arrivals, including 372 children, 26 elderly people and
17 people with disabilities, which calls for the provision of child protection
services, medical referral and psychosocial support to the most vulnerable
groups, to ensure that their basic human rights are respected in an overcrowded
and resource-limited environment.
Humanitarian
response and gaps
Key Actors
The humanitarian response in Lebanon is distributed among
government institutions, UN coordination mechanisms, and international
humanitarian organizations. The Lebanese government, through the Ministry of
Social Affairs and the IDP Registration Platform, is leading the process of
registering those affected and expanding the network of shelters to meet
emergency needs. According to the UNHCR brief, 517,000 IDPs have registered on
the government platform as of 8 March 2026, including 117,228 people in collective
shelters, reflecting the scale of the significant displacement and the
increasing pressure on the infrastructure of basic services[29].
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, co-ordinates humanitarian response
sectors, including protection, shelter, cash assistance and relief items, as
well as supporting the equipping of public buildings as temporary shelters.
UNICEF focuses its interventions on child protection, supporting
water and sanitation services in shelters, and ensuring the continuity of basic
services for displaced people. At the same time, WHO is monitoring the impact
of the conflict on the health system, and coordinates with the Lebanese
Ministry of Health to respond to health crises resulting from displacement and
overcrowding. and providing psychological and social support to the displaced[30].
Key gaps
The available data reveal a number of key gaps in the humanitarian
response in Lebanon during the current crisis:
1. The shelter gap for Palestinian refugees outside the official
centers, as it was pointed out that the opening of schools to house the
displaced in Beddawi camp was delayed, which led many families to rely on
relatives or rent private housing despite the difficult economic conditions[31].
2. The WASH and waste
management services gap in the southern camps, as the halt in waste collection
and the closure of some health facilities in the Tyre camps have escalated
health risks in a crowded environment, raising the need for urgent
interventions to ensure public health.
3. The gap in
coordination and targeting within the camps, such as in the Rashidieh camp,
which received a large influx of Lebanese, Syrians, and Palestinians together,
amid criticism of the weakness of a comprehensive relief plan in the vicinity
of Tyre, which reflects the challenges of planning and management during
multinational crises[32].
4. The protection and education gap as a result of the use of
schools as temporary shelters, while the temporary closure of UNRWA schools
threatens the continuity of education for the thousands of Palestinian children
who depend on them, increasing the vulnerability of the most vulnerable groups.
Quick
comparative schedule of displacement-affected camps/areas as of 14 March 2026
|
Location |
Displacement
Trend |
Available
Grade |
Outstanding
Need/Service Features |
Confidence
level |
|
Nahr al-Bared
camp |
Indoor Inside
the Camp / North of the Camps |
3000 – 2500 Beds |
Severe
overcrowding, lack of water and hygiene, partial health services |
High |
|
Beddawi Camp |
Indoor
Camp/Adjacent Areas |
2500-2000 Families |
Pressure on
rental housing, stop some whirlpools, urgent intervention WASH |
Medium-High |
|
Rashidieh
Camp |
Indoor/South
Camps |
2000 - 1500 Families |
Medium
overcrowding, lack of health services, partial education |
Medium |
|
Southern
Regions (Sur, Bint Jbeil) |
Internal displacement towards villages and nearby areas |
1200-1000
Family |
Some basic
services are partially available, limited education |
Medium |
|
Beirut and
the North outside the camps |
Internal displacement towards rented housing |
1000-800
Family |
Relatively
low pressure on infrastructure, dependence on foreign aid |
Medium |
Table Sources:
Local Sources and UNRWA Reports
Priority needs and recommendations: multisectoral needs assessment
Based on available data and current hosting patterns within
Palestinian camps and temporary shelters, displaced Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon appear to face a range of urgent humanitarian needs, including several
key sectors:
First: Safe and
dignified shelter
The data show an urgent need to expand the capacity of shelters for
Palestinian refugees, or to provide temporary housing alternatives, to
alleviate reliance on high rents or accommodation in overcrowded shelters.
Overcrowding poses a direct threat to health and safety, and limits the ability
of families to maintain a minimum level of privacy and safety, reflecting a
violation of the right to adequate housing and adequate living conditions in
accordance with international human rights standards and international
humanitarian law.[33]
Second: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Waste Management
The current situation requires urgent intervention to restart or
support water and waste collection services in the affected camps, as health
risks are compounded in overcrowded environments that already have limited
sanitation and solid waste management infrastructure. This situation reflects a
violation of the right to health and the right to safe water and sanitation, in
accordance with international human rights standards and international
humanitarian law[34].
Third: Primary
Health Services and Medical Referral
The need to support primary health care services within the camps
is an urgent priority, with effective referral mechanisms to alternative health
facilities in the event that existing clinics are inaccessible due to security
restrictions or the temporary closure of some health centres. It is also
important to monitor communicable diseases in overcrowded shelters and
collective shelters, ensuring respect for the right to health and protection
from health risks, in accordance with international human rights standards and
international humanitarian law[35].
Fourth: Protection (Children, Gender, Disability, Psychosocial
Support)
The humanitarian response requires special attention to the most
vulnerable groups, especially children, who constitute a large proportion of
displaced people, as estimated by UN organizations, as well as women, the
elderly, and persons with disabilities. Mechanisms for the prevention of
exploitation, abuse and gender-based violence in shelters and overcrowded areas
within camps should also be strengthened, in line with international
obligations to protect human rights and the rights of refugees, and standards
for the protection of vulnerable groups in emergencies.
Fifth:
Education and Continuity of Learning
The use of schools as shelters and the suspension of some
educational activities have disrupted the educational process for a large
number of refugee children. Flexible educational solutions, such as educational
compensation programmes, distance learning or the creation of temporary
learning spaces, are needed to ensure that prolonged interruptions from
education are minimized and reflect a commitment to children's right to
education in accordance with international human rights standards and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.[36]
Sixth: Cash
Support and Livelihoods
There is a need for multi-purpose emergency cash support programmes
to help displaced families cover basic needs such as rent, food, and medicine,
especially in light of the limited employment opportunities available to Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon and the historical legal restrictions imposed on their
participation in the formal labour market. The provision of such support is
consistent with international obligations to ensure the right to an adequate
standard of living, and protection from poverty and deprivation, in accordance
with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law.[37]
Short-term
recommendations
First: For
humanitarian actors (within 0-3 months)
1. Establish a unified
monitoring system for Palestinian refugee displacement that integrates UNRWA
shelter data with that of popular committees and humanitarian response
partners, thereby reducing duplication and improving the accuracy of aid
targeting using simplified family identifiers.
2. Provide a minimum
package of shelter supplies within the receiving camps, including sleeping
facilities and interior partitions that ensure minimal privacy, lighting, and
cleaning materials, especially in Nahr el-Bared and Beddawi camps, where many
families reside in overcrowded houses or temporarily rented housing[38].
3. Implement urgent
interventions in the water, sanitation and hygiene sector within camps affected
by the interruption of services, including waste collection, sludge transport
and water supply, in coordination with response mechanisms led by UNICEF and its
partners in shelters.[39]
4. Deploy mobile health
services and first aid points within camps in situations where primary
health-care services are disrupted or reduced due to security constraints or
lack of resources.
5. Strengthen protection
mechanisms from exploitation and abuse (PSEA) and refer cases of gender-based
violence within shelters and camps, with special attention to persons with
disabilities, the elderly, and unaccompanied children.
Second: For
Decision Makers (within 0-3 months)
1. Affirm the principle of non-discrimination in access to shelters
and public services, and ensure that all those affected – including Palestinian
and non-Lebanese refugees – are able to access emergency services in accordance
with established humanitarian standards.[40]
2. Take local measures to reduce the exploitation of rents in
emergency situations through municipal directives or local organizations where
conditions allow, given the emergence of early indications of a rapid rise in
rents within areas receiving IDPs, especially in the vicinity of the camps.
Medium-term
recommendations
1. Rehabilitation and
strengthening of the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure within Palestinian camps,
including water networks, sanitation systems, and solid waste management
mechanisms, as this system represents one of the most vulnerable structural
vulnerabilities in situations of overpopulation and protracted emergencies,
which may lead to widespread health and environmental risks if not addressed
proactively.
2. Develop and implement a
multi-track compensatory education plan aimed at ensuring the continuity of
education for children and students affected by displacement, through the
adoption of flexible educational alternatives such as temporary schools, a
multi-shift system, or digital learning and community-based education
solutions, especially in cases where schools are used as shelters or where the
educational process is disrupted as a result of security and humanitarian
crises.[41]
3. Develop quasi-emergency
approaches to support livelihoods within camps and receiving areas for IDPs,
including cash-for-work programs linked to service and community activities
such as maintenance of WASH facilities, public hygiene work, and light restoration
of housing and infrastructure, in order to achieve an integration between
humanitarian response and temporary employment opportunities, taking into
account the legal and regulatory constraints associated with the work of Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon.
4 . Launch a structured political and human rights dialogue on the
structural constraints imposed on Palestinian refugees, particularly in the
areas of employment, social security, and housing, as repeated crises and wars
reveal that the persistence of these legal restrictions limits the ability of
refugee communities to adapt and strengthen their resilience, and in turn,
leads to a deepening dependence on humanitarian aid.
Data gaps and
monitoring indicators
First: Data
Gaps
A review of available data on Palestinian displacement in Lebanon
reveals a number of structural gaps in the data, limiting the ability to
produce accurate estimates and plan an evidence-based humanitarian response.
The most prominent of these gaps can be summarized as follows:
1. The absence of a unified
real-time census of displaced Palestinians, distributed by camp or district and
type of residence (official shelters, accommodation with relatives, rental
housing, or living in the open). The current data are split between UNRWA
shelter registrations, unofficial statistics from popular committees, and
estimates in press coverage, resulting in a marked discrepancy in the figures
circulating.
2. Weak data on the
demographic characteristics of displaced Palestinians, particularly with regard
to age groups, gender, and disability, as these data are not systematically
available, with the exception of some limited local estimates that have emerged
in certain cases such as Rashidiya camp.
3. The lack of clarity in
the overlap and duplication in the calculation of the numbers of displaced
Palestinians between two main categories:
(a) IDPs registered in UNRWA-run shelters
(b) Displaced persons who have moved to camps in northern Lebanon
This overlap makes it possible for some individuals or households
to be counted more than once when collecting numbers from different sources.
4. The difficulty of
tracking the impact of the interruption or disruption of basic services within
the camps – such as primary health care services, waste collection and water
supply – on a daily and systematic basis, limits the ability to assess the
direct impact of the crisis on health and environmental conditions within the
camps.
Second:
Proposed Monitoring Indicators
In order to develop an actionable weekly dashboard that will help
support rapid assessments and humanitarian response planning, it is proposed to
adopt a set of key indicators distributed across a number of vital sectors, as
follows:
1. Population
and movement
• Number of
displaced Palestinian families registered using a Unified Family ID.
The total
number of displaced individuals.
• The number of
cases of movement or secondary displacement during a seven-day period.
2. Shelter
• Occupancy
rate of shelters. (%)
• The
proportion of families living in rented accommodation or with relatives
compared to families living in shelters or in the open.
3. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
• Average daily
water availability hours within the affected camps.
• Number of
solid waste removal or sludge transfer interventions.
4. Health
• The
number of clinics or health centers operating within the camps.
• The
number of emergency medical referrals recorded per week.
5. Education
• The number of missing school days for refugee children
during the week.
THE PALESTINIAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (WITNESS)
[1] Disaster Risk
Management Unit. (2026, March 11). Lebanon displacement figures following
escalation of hostilities. Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office.
[2] United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East. (2026). Situation report: Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon during the escalation of hostilities. https://www.unrwa.org
[3] Lebanese Ministry of Social
Affairs. (2026). Displacement and vulnerability data in southern Lebanon.
Internal report.
[4] UNRWA. (2026). Situation
report: Protection and humanitarian risks for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon
during hostilities. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees in the Near East. https://www.unrwa.org
[5] UNRWA.(2026). Situation report: Snapshot of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon —
March 14, 2026. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees in the Near East. https://www.unrwa.org
[6] United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). (2026, March). Flash update: Lebanon displacement and
humanitarian situation. https://www.unhcr.org
[7]Lebanese–Palestinian Dialogue Committee. (2025). Legal framework for
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: Analysis and recommendations. Beirut,
Lebanon.
[8] Lebanese–Palestinian Dialogue
Committee, Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics, & Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics. (2017). General population and housing census
in Palestinian camps and gatherings in Lebanon. Beirut, Lebanon. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps
[9] Lebanese–Palestinian Dialogue
Committee, Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics, & Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics. (2017). General population and housing census
in Palestinian camps and gatherings in Lebanon. Beirut, Lebanon. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps
[10] Lebanese–Palestinian Dialogue
Committee. (2025). Legal framework for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon:
Analysis and recommendations. Beirut, Lebanon.
[11] Lebanese–Palestinian Dialogue
Committee, 2025
[12] Human Rights Watch. (2026). Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon: Legal restrictions and systemic discrimination. https://www.hrw.org
[13] Lebanese–Palestinian Dialogue
Committee, Lebanese Central Administration of Statistics, & Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics. (2017). General population and housing census
in Palestinian camps and gatherings in Lebanon. Beirut, Lebanon. https://www.pcbs.gov.ps
[14] United Nations Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA). (2026). Situation report: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.https://www.unrwa.org
[15] United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2026). Lebanon: Flash update on
escalation of hostilities and internal displacement. https://www.unocha.org
[16] United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). (2026). Lebanon
emergency situation update: Displacement of Palestinian refugees during the
March escalation. https://www.unrwa.org
[17] United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2026). Lebanon: Flash update
on escalation of hostilities and displacement (March 2026). https://www.unocha.org
[18] International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC). (2026). Lebanon: Escalation of hostilities and humanitarian
needs update. https://www.icrc.org
[19] United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF). (2026). Lebanon humanitarian situation report: Escalation and
internal displacement update. https://www.unicef.org
[20] United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2026). Lebanon: Escalation of
hostilities – Flash update on displacement and humanitarian needs. New
York: United Nations.
[21] United Nations Children's Fund.
(2026). Lebanon humanitarian situation report: Escalation and displacement
update. https://www.unicef.org
[22] United Nations Children's Fund.
(2026). Lebanon humanitarian situation report: Escalation response update,
12 March 2026. New York: UNICEF.
[23] World Health Organization. (2026).Lebanon: Health emergency situation report. Geneva: World Health
Organization.
[24] Lebanese Ministry of Education.
(2026). A Report on Turning Schools into Shelters during the Current Crisis.
Beirut: Ministry of Education.
[25] UNRWA. (2026).Updating the Educational and Humanitarian Situation of Palestinian Refugees
in Lebanon. Beirut. UNRWA:
[26] Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue
Committee. (2017). General
Population and Housing Census in Palestinian Camps and Communities in Lebanon. Beirut:
Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee.
[27] Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. (2026). Lebanon displacement and protection
update. Geneva: UNHCR.
[28] UN Human Rights Office. (2026). Lebanon: Human rights alerts and displacement
updates. Geneva: OHCHR.
[29] Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. (2026). Lebanon displacement registration and
shelter update. Geneva: UNHCR.
[30] UNRWA. (2026). Lebanon emergency situation update. Beirut: UNRWA.
[31] اليونيسف. (2026). Lebanon:
Child protection and humanitarian response update. بيروت: UNICEF.
[32] United
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). (2026). Lebanon: Humanitarian flash
update on escalation of hostilities. Geneva: OCHA.
[35] International Committee of the Red
Cross. (n.d.). Health care and international humanitarian law.
[40] United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2018). Core
Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability.