Reports & Researches

Analytical Report on Displaced Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon during the Current War Crisis

Executive Summary

Since 2 March 2026, Israel and Lebanon have been witnessing a rapid escalation marked by widespread evacuation orders, intensified airstrikes, and the spillover of the effects of the fighting into urban areas. This context has generated massive waves of internal displacement in Lebanon, with data from the Lebanese government's Disaster Risk Management Unit indicating that the number of registered IDPs reached 816,700 as of 11 March 2026, including 125,800 people residing in 590 collective shelters, while the rest were distributed to relatives' homes or temporary housing. This displacement occurred less than ten days after the start of the escalation, exacerbating the fragility of the service infrastructure and the already limited government capacity, and putting severe pressure on the system of shelters, schools, and public services in various regions of Lebanon[1].

Within this crisis, the displacement of Palestinian refugees (including Palestinians displaced from Syria) emerges as a form of "displacement within displacement", with Palestinian families moving from camps in the south and Beirut to camps in the north or to UNRWA-run shelters or public buildings, with a clear overlap between Palestinian displacement and Lebanese and Syrian displacement to or from[2]camps.

The most prominent figures available as of 14 March 2026 indicate that 1,567 displaced Palestinians (436 families) were registered in emergency shelters run by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) in Lebanon as of about 10 March, distributed at a centre in Siblin/a nearby school complex in the vicinity of Sidon and a Battir school in northern Lebanon. A total of 290 families (1,015 individuals) have been displaced from Tyre camps (Rashidiya, Burj al-Shamali and al-Bass) to shelters since 2 March. In addition, 52 Palestinian families (201 individuals) have moved from Beirut to the Dbayeh and Mar Elias camps since the beginning of the escalation.

At the same time, the northern camps received additional waves of displacement outside the official shelter system, as 350 Palestinian families arrived in Nahr al-Bared camp coming from Beirut and the south, according to the statistics of the popular committees in the camp, and 230 Palestinian families arrived in Beddawi camp, with indications of a relief gap and a delay in opening facilities and schools to house the new arrivals. Palestinians from Syria, as well as Lebanese, Syrian and Egyptian families. The data indicates that 372 children, 26 elderly people and 17 people with disabilities are among the total arrivals, reflecting the concentration of needs among the most vulnerable groups.[3]

The main risks to IDPs stem from several interrelated factors, including limited safe housing options, high rents and overcrowding within camps, the decline of some of UNRWA's essential health, education and waste collection services in the affected areas, as well as the increasing pressure on water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services within camps and shelters. Challenges related to social and psychological protection, including trauma, gender-based violence risks and child protection in overcrowded environments, are also exacerbated. The chronic legal and structural constraints faced by Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in the areas of employment, property, and social security, as well as the immediate security risks associated with shelling, eviction orders, and field reports on the use of weapons with dangerous humanitarian implications in some of the affected areas[4].

 

 

 

 

Framework, Context and Data Methodology

The definition of "Displaced Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon" in this report:

The report includes two main categories:

1.Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon (historically registered with the Lebanese State and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), residing in Palestinian camps or communities).

2.Palestinians from Syria in Lebanon (Palestinian refugees who have been displaced from Syria to Lebanon since the outbreak of the Syriancrisis), given their appearance in the current displacement flows, as shown in the arrival data of some camps, including the presence of 6 families of Syrian Palestinians among those arriving in Rashidieh camp during the recent waves of displacement.

Time Point:

The report adopts a time reference point of 14 March 2026 (Asia Time/Beirut). Given the dynamic nature of the crisis, figures on IDPs, victims or shelters remain changing daily, so the data in this report are presented in the form of snapshots or estimated ranges with reference to the level of confidence in the source whenever possible[5].

Data Collection and Verification Methodology:

The report relied primarily on local sources specialized in following up on the conditions of the Palestinian camps, especially the "Sada Diaspora" platform, as it monitors the developments of displacement within the camps on the ground and documents the movements of families and the needs of vulnerable groups in cooperation with local popular committees.

In parallel, credible UN and humanitarian sources have been employed to assess the overall context of displacement and developments in the humanitarian situation in Lebanon, including the UNHCR Flash Update, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) updates, as well as data and reports from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as well as ICRC assessments of the humanitarian situation and basic services in areas of displacement[6].

In the legal and human rights aspect, the report was based on materials and analysis issued by the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee on the legal framework for the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, as well as Human Rights Watch reports documenting the legal constraints and historical discrimination faced by Palestinian refugees in the areas of employment, property, and social security, and the direct impact this has on their resilience during crises and[7]conflicts.

To determine the population baseline of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the report relied on the results of the "General Census of Population and Housing in Palestinian Camps and Communities in Lebanon 2017" issued by the Lebanese-Palestinian Dialogue Committee in cooperation with the Lebanese Central Bureau of Statistics and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, as the most detailed official statistical reference at the level of Palestinian camps and communities[8].

A note about accessing sources:

Some of the official UNRWA pages were not directly accessible during the verification process due to technical access restrictions (Error 403), and in some cases local and specialized sources were relied upon to transmit UNRWA data, treated as secondary sources of the Agency's data, and a higher degree of caution in assessing the level of confidence in the use of such data.

 

Size, demographics, and geographical distribution

Understanding the patterns of Palestinian refugee displacement during the current crisis depends on two analytical levels:

(a) Population baseline prior to the current crisis

(b) Displacement and population movements since 2 March 2026

Population baseline according to official census

The General Census of Population and Housing in Palestinian Camps and Communities in Lebanon (2017) showed that the total adjusted number of Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon amounted to 174,422 individuals. The census also showed that 50.4% of the population is male and 49.6% are female, and that the average family size is 4 members, while female-headed households constitute about 17.2% of all Palestinian households in Lebanon[9].

The General Census of Population and Housing in Palestinian Camps and Communities in Lebanon (2017) also shows that the geographical distribution of Palestinian refugees within the camps and communities included in the study tends to be concentrated in the Sidon region (35.8%), followed by the northern region (25.1%), then the Tyre region (14.7%), the Peruvian region (13.4%), the Chouf (7.1%), and the Bekaa (4.0%). This distribution is an important factor in understanding current displacement trajectories, as the southern and Sidon regions – home to the largest concentrations of Palestinian refugees – have been among the areas most affected by the recent military escalation.[10]

 

Comparison of Camps by Population and Composition of Nationalities (2017)

The 2017 General Census of Population and Housing in Palestinian Camps and Communities in Lebanon provides an important demographic baseline for understanding the reality of Palestinian camps prior to the current war. Its data show that a number of camps no longer include not only Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon, but also Palestinians displaced from Syria, as well as Lebanese, Syrians, and others within the camps[11].

In Burj al-Barajneh camp, the total population within the camp was 18,351 people, including 8,219 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 687 displaced Palestinians from Syria, 529 Lebanese, 8,790 Syrians, and 126 other groups. The total population of the 1000 camp was 2,359 people, including 1,935 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 253 Palestinians displaced from Syria. In Burj al-Shamali camp, the total number of people was 10,218, including 8,142 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 1. 444 Palestinians displaced from Syria. Shatila camp has a total population of 14,010, including 4,156 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 537 Palestinians displaced from Syria, as well as 1,155 Lebanese and 8,064 Syrians, making it one of the most mixed[12]camps in terms of demographics.

In Dbayeh camp, the total population was 1,772, including 758 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. In Ein al-Hilweh camp, the largest of the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, the total population was 21,209, including 18,763 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 1,523 Palestinians displaced from Syria. The total population of Mar Elias camp was 1,767, including 748 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 55 Palestinians displaced from Syria. In Rashidieh camp, the total number was 9,656, of which 8,641 were Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 560 were A Palestinian displaced from Syria. Nahr el-Bared camp has a total population of 9,470, including 8,091 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 1,015 Palestinians displaced from Syria. In Wefel camp, a total of 2,165 people were killed, including 1,421 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 626 Palestinians displaced from Syria. The total population of Beddawi camp is 17,995, including 9,740 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 1,367 Palestinians displaced from Syria, along with 630 Lebanese and 6,193 Syrians. The total population of Al-Buss camp was 5,234, including 4,073 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and 412 Palestinians displaced from Syria.

These data reveal that a number of camps, notably Burj al-Barajneh, Shatila and Beddawi, before the current war had large non-Palestinian population blocs, which means that any new displacement to or from these camps will quickly hit the limits of the capacity to absorb services and infrastructure, and that the humanitarian and security pressure during the war does not affect Palestinians alone inside the camps.[13]

Palestinian displacement documented since 2 March 2026

As of 14 March 2026, there is no unified dashboard that compiles all patterns of Palestinian displacement in Lebanon, whether within or between camps, to public shelters or to rented accommodation. However, an initial operational picture can be built across four main baskets: the first is the presence of 1,567 displaced Palestinians (436 families) inside UNRWA shelters as of about 10 March, the displacement of 290 families (1,015 individuals) from the Rashidieh, Burj al-Shamali and Al-Bass camps to shelters, and the third is the relocation of 290 families (1,015 individuals) from the Rashidieh, Burj al-Shamali and Al-Bas camps to the shelters 52 families (201 individuals) from Beirut to Dbayeh and Mar Elias camps, while the fourth basket is represented in displacement and reception between camps outside the framework of official shelters, where 350 families arrived in Nahr el-Bared and 230 families to Beddawi, according to the statistics of the popular committees.

In terms of confidence level, the figures for IDPs within shelters appear to be of high to moderate confidence because they are based on an organized record, although they are transmitted through intermediate sources. The figures of the popular committees regarding the arrival of 350 and 230 families in Nahr el-Bared and Beddawi camps are moderately reliable, strong on the ground but susceptible to rapid change or duplication, and do not always include an accurate count of individuals. In contrast, the broader distribution of displacement to and from the camps of Beirut, Sidon and the Bekaa remains to be estimated Low to medium confidence due to the lack of comprehensive and up-to-date digital coverage. This analytical estimate is based on the multiplicity of field monitoring sources and the absence of a unified and up-to-date dashboard of Palestinian displacement between camps until 14 March 2026[14].

The Path of Displacement Since the Outbreak of the War

The trajectory of Palestinian refugee displacement in Lebanon during the March 2026 escalation can be traced by linking Palestinian population movements to the broader context of internal displacement in the country. The first wave began with the expansion of airstrikes and eviction orders since 2 March 2026, accompanied by widespread disruption of education and the opening of hundreds of public shelters, with tens of thousands of displaced people registered in the first days alone. Humanitarian updates show that school closures and the conversion of schools into shelters have been a form of one from the outset Key determinants of the subsequent displacement trajectory, including for Palestinian refugees who have had to move between camps or resort to temporary shelter arrangements.[15]

As the scope of operations expanded, UNRWA's response began to take on a more visible practical character, with the opening of shelter facilities in Siblin and the vicinity of Sidon, and early indications emerged that Palestinian displacement was shifting from a localized displacement from the south and Beirut to a multi-directional displacement, which also included camps in the north. In this context, 5 March and 6 March emerged as hotspots, with threats escalating in the vicinity of Beirut and the suburbs, and the influx of Palestinian families into Nahr el-Bared, where 350 Palestinian families arrived Data of the popular committees in the camp[16].

By 8 March 2026, the picture was clearer in terms of documented Palestinian displacement to shelters, with 342 Palestinian families (1,216 individuals) documenting the displacement of 342 Palestinian families (1,216 individuals), including 290 families (1,015 individuals) from the Rashidieh, Burj al-Shamali and Al-Buss camps in the Tyre area, in addition to 52 families (201 individuals) from Beirut to Dbayeh and Mar Elias camps. This phase shows that Palestinian displacement has taken two parallel paths: The first is to formal or semi-official shelters, and the second is to the Palestinian camps that are less at immediate risk[17].

On 10 March, there were clear signs of pressure shifting towards the northern camps, with 230 Palestinian families arriving in Beddawi camp, at a time when UN reports were pointing to a rapid expansion of total displacement in Lebanon. Then, on 11 March, Rashidieh received a mixed influx of 234 families (1,014 people), including 71 Palestinian families and 6 Syrian Palestinian families, as well as vulnerable groups including large numbers of children, the elderly, and people with disabilities[18].

As of March 12, 2026, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has estimated the number of IDPs registered in Lebanon at 816,700, including 285,600 children, as severe pressure continues on schools used as shelters and on basic services. On March 13, human rights warnings about the expansion of eviction orders increased, while UN and media reports indicated that the number of displaced people in Lebanon had exceeded 800,000 in less than two weeks of escalation. This general context gives an explanatory dimension He explains that the movements of Palestinian refugees were not isolated, but came within a broad national wave of displacement, but took a more complex form due to the fragility of the camps and the specificity of the refugees' legal and social status[19].

Analytically, this timeline shows two major leaps in Palestinian displacement: the first during the period from 2 to 8 March in the displacement from the south/Tyre and Beirut to shelters and alternative camps; This also coincides with the acceleration of the general displacement in Lebanon from some 517,000 registered as of 8 March to 816,700 registered up to 816,700 March 12, with subsequent estimates that the number of displaced people will exceed 800,000 in the middle of the month, according to humanitarian updates issued by the UN and Lebanese disaster management agencies.

Living conditions, protection and access to services

Shelter and overcrowding

Displacement patterns in Lebanon during the March 2026 escalation show a range of predominant features that also apply to displaced Palestinians, with additional peculiarities related to the nature of the camps and the legal status of refugees. One of the most prominent features is the rapid relocation in emergency conditions without the ability to transport basic goods or property, as well as the increasing reliance on informal accommodation arrangements such as accommodation with relatives or acquaintances, temporary overnight stays in cars, or the use of unfinished buildings. This is due to Mainly due to the rapid filling of collective shelters during the first days of the military escalation and the expansion of internal displacement[20].

At the level of Palestinian camps specifically, three main types of housing arrangements for IDPs can be observed. The first is accommodation with relatives or acquaintances in the receiving camps, particularly in the northern camps. In Beddawi camp, some 230 Palestinian expatriate families were divided between staying with relatives in overcrowded houses or renting housing at their own expense despite the difficult economic conditions in the camps.

The second type is the increasing pressure on the rental market within the camps and the potential for economic exploitation that may accompany it. In Nahr el-Bared camp, the popular committee in the camp called on homeowners not to raise rents with the arrival of displaced families, which reflects the sensitivity of the limited housing market within the camp and the possibility of it turning into an economic pressure channel on displaced families in light of the limited housing options available.

The third pattern is mixed overcrowding within some camps in the south. Rashidieh camp has received an influx of 1,014 people of multiple nationalities, including Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, and others, increasing pressure on limited basic services within the camp and leading to increased competition for basic resources such as housing, water, and health services.

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

UNICEF reports that the pressure on water, sanitation and electricity services is increasing as the number of displaced people increases, and that many families are staying in inadequate or unsafe places, which increases health risks and calls for emergency interventions in the WASH sector within shelters[21].

In a humanitarian update issued on 12 March 2026, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported that its partners implemented emergency WASH interventions in 188 shelters across Lebanon, targeting some 11,200 families (approximately 46,000 people). These interventions included repairing sanitary facilities, installing additional showers and latrines — including units for people with disabilities — as well as distributing cleaning materials, water tanker transportation, and removing sludge from shelter latrines to reduce the spread of COVID-19 One of the health risks associated with overcrowding inside temporary shelters[22].

Inside the Palestinian camps, field indicators indicate a relative deterioration in water, sanitation and hygiene services in a number of camps located in the Tyre area. In Burj al-Shamali, Rashidiya and al-Buss camps, the closure of some clinics and the disruption of waste collection services have led to the accumulation of waste and the rise of health concerns in an already densely populated environment and weak infrastructure for basic services.

Health

The World Health Organization (WHO) describes the health situation in Lebanon as a rapidly deepening health crisis, with the military escalation leading to the closure of dozens of primary health care centres and the rendering of some hospitals out of service due to damage or evacuation orders, increasing the need for emergency services and medical care.[23]

Overcrowding in shelters and poor access to water and sanitation services increase the risk of the spread of respiratory and waterborne diseases, especially among women and children, who make up a large proportion of the displaced.

For Palestinian refugees, local reports indicate that the suspension of some UNRWA primary health services in the southern areas has led to an immediate gap in health care, leading many refugees to rely on private pharmacies or local solidarity networks for treatment.

Education

At the national level, the transformation of public schools into temporary shelters has led to a widespread disruption of the educational process. As of 11 March 2026, 344 public schools were converted into shelters, 92% of which are fully full, hosting more than 58,000 displaced people. This resulted in the disruption of the education of more than 72,000 students in the morning shift and about 39,000 students in the evening shift in these schools, reflecting the severe pressure on the educational infrastructure due to internal displacement.[24]

As for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA reports indicate that since 2 March, the Agency's schools and vocational training centre have been closed in line with the decision of the Lebanese Ministry of Education, resulting in a temporary suspension of education for thousands of Palestinian students who rely on these schools[25].

 

Livelihoods and social protection

The population baseline in the 2017 Census of Palestinian Camps and Communities in Lebanon reveals significant vulnerability in the labour market for Palestinian refugees. The census showed that only 5.2% of Palestinian workers had official work leave, reflecting the prevalence of informal work and the absence of basic social protection tools such as compensation or health insurance.

During the current crisis, this economic and social fragility is further illustrated by reports on the ground indicating rising commodity and fuel prices, the suspension of many daily and agricultural activities, and the limited capacity of the camps to absorb new arrivals without organized external support. This reality highlights the compounding pressure on Palestinian refugees during the conflicts because of structural legal restrictions on the right to work and social security in Lebanon.[26]

Protection concerns

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, notes that high levels of fear, anxiety and psychological stress among displaced people as a result of repeated displacement, loss of shelter and uncertainty about the future are high, stressing the need to put humanitarian protection at the heart of the emergency response.[27]

UN human rights experts have warned that thousands of displaced people, including children, have been forced to sleep in their cars or on the roads, and that widespread eviction orders could lead to forced displacement that may contravene international humanitarian law's provisions on the protection of civilians during armed conflict[28].

In Rashidiya camp, the scale of the protection burden illustrates the influx of 1,014 new arrivals, including 372 children, 26 elderly people and 17 people with disabilities, which calls for the provision of child protection services, medical referral and psychosocial support to the most vulnerable groups, to ensure that their basic human rights are respected in an overcrowded and resource-limited environment.

Humanitarian response and gaps

Key Actors

The humanitarian response in Lebanon is distributed among government institutions, UN coordination mechanisms, and international humanitarian organizations. The Lebanese government, through the Ministry of Social Affairs and the IDP Registration Platform, is leading the process of registering those affected and expanding the network of shelters to meet emergency needs. According to the UNHCR brief, 517,000 IDPs have registered on the government platform as of 8 March 2026, including 117,228 people in collective shelters, reflecting the scale of the significant displacement and the increasing pressure on the infrastructure of basic services[29].

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, co-ordinates humanitarian response sectors, including protection, shelter, cash assistance and relief items, as well as supporting the equipping of public buildings as temporary shelters.

UNICEF focuses its interventions on child protection, supporting water and sanitation services in shelters, and ensuring the continuity of basic services for displaced people. At the same time, WHO is monitoring the impact of the conflict on the health system, and coordinates with the Lebanese Ministry of Health to respond to health crises resulting from displacement and overcrowding. and providing psychological and social support to the displaced[30].

Key gaps

The available data reveal a number of key gaps in the humanitarian response in Lebanon during the current crisis:

1. The shelter gap for Palestinian refugees outside the official centers, as it was pointed out that the opening of schools to house the displaced in Beddawi camp was delayed, which led many families to rely on relatives or rent private housing despite the difficult economic conditions[31].

2. The WASH and waste management services gap in the southern camps, as the halt in waste collection and the closure of some health facilities in the Tyre camps have escalated health risks in a crowded environment, raising the need for urgent interventions to ensure public health.

3. The gap in coordination and targeting within the camps, such as in the Rashidieh camp, which received a large influx of Lebanese, Syrians, and Palestinians together, amid criticism of the weakness of a comprehensive relief plan in the vicinity of Tyre, which reflects the challenges of planning and management during multinational crises[32].

4. The protection and education gap as a result of the use of schools as temporary shelters, while the temporary closure of UNRWA schools threatens the continuity of education for the thousands of Palestinian children who depend on them, increasing the vulnerability of the most vulnerable groups.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quick comparative schedule of displacement-affected camps/areas as of 14 March 2026

 

Location

Displacement Trend

Available Grade

Outstanding Need/Service Features

Confidence level

Nahr al-Bared camp

Indoor Inside the Camp / North of the Camps

3000 – 2500 Beds

Severe overcrowding, lack of water and hygiene, partial health services

High

Beddawi Camp

Indoor Camp/Adjacent Areas

2500-2000 Families

Pressure on rental housing, stop some whirlpools, urgent intervention WASH

Medium-High

Rashidieh Camp

Indoor/South Camps

2000 - 1500 Families

Medium overcrowding, lack of health services, partial education

Medium

Southern Regions (Sur, Bint Jbeil)

Internal displacement towards villages and nearby areas

1200-1000

Family

Some basic services are partially available, limited education

Medium

Beirut and the North outside the camps

Internal displacement towards rented housing

1000-800

Family

Relatively low pressure on infrastructure, dependence on foreign aid

Medium

 

Table Sources: Local Sources and UNRWA Reports

Priority needs and recommendations: multisectoral needs assessment

Based on available data and current hosting patterns within Palestinian camps and temporary shelters, displaced Palestinian refugees in Lebanon appear to face a range of urgent humanitarian needs, including several key sectors:

First: Safe and dignified shelter

The data show an urgent need to expand the capacity of shelters for Palestinian refugees, or to provide temporary housing alternatives, to alleviate reliance on high rents or accommodation in overcrowded shelters. Overcrowding poses a direct threat to health and safety, and limits the ability of families to maintain a minimum level of privacy and safety, reflecting a violation of the right to adequate housing and adequate living conditions in accordance with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law.[33]

Second: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) and Waste Management

The current situation requires urgent intervention to restart or support water and waste collection services in the affected camps, as health risks are compounded in overcrowded environments that already have limited sanitation and solid waste management infrastructure. This situation reflects a violation of the right to health and the right to safe water and sanitation, in accordance with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law[34].

Third: Primary Health Services and Medical Referral

The need to support primary health care services within the camps is an urgent priority, with effective referral mechanisms to alternative health facilities in the event that existing clinics are inaccessible due to security restrictions or the temporary closure of some health centres. It is also important to monitor communicable diseases in overcrowded shelters and collective shelters, ensuring respect for the right to health and protection from health risks, in accordance with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law[35].

Fourth: Protection (Children, Gender, Disability, Psychosocial Support)

The humanitarian response requires special attention to the most vulnerable groups, especially children, who constitute a large proportion of displaced people, as estimated by UN organizations, as well as women, the elderly, and persons with disabilities. Mechanisms for the prevention of exploitation, abuse and gender-based violence in shelters and overcrowded areas within camps should also be strengthened, in line with international obligations to protect human rights and the rights of refugees, and standards for the protection of vulnerable groups in emergencies.

Fifth: Education and Continuity of Learning

The use of schools as shelters and the suspension of some educational activities have disrupted the educational process for a large number of refugee children. Flexible educational solutions, such as educational compensation programmes, distance learning or the creation of temporary learning spaces, are needed to ensure that prolonged interruptions from education are minimized and reflect a commitment to children's right to education in accordance with international human rights standards and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.[36]

Sixth: Cash Support and Livelihoods

There is a need for multi-purpose emergency cash support programmes to help displaced families cover basic needs such as rent, food, and medicine, especially in light of the limited employment opportunities available to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the historical legal restrictions imposed on their participation in the formal labour market. The provision of such support is consistent with international obligations to ensure the right to an adequate standard of living, and protection from poverty and deprivation, in accordance with international human rights standards and international humanitarian law.[37]

Short-term recommendations

First: For humanitarian actors (within 0-3 months)

1. Establish a unified monitoring system for Palestinian refugee displacement that integrates UNRWA shelter data with that of popular committees and humanitarian response partners, thereby reducing duplication and improving the accuracy of aid targeting using simplified family identifiers.

2. Provide a minimum package of shelter supplies within the receiving camps, including sleeping facilities and interior partitions that ensure minimal privacy, lighting, and cleaning materials, especially in Nahr el-Bared and Beddawi camps, where many families reside in overcrowded houses or temporarily rented housing[38].

3. Implement urgent interventions in the water, sanitation and hygiene sector within camps affected by the interruption of services, including waste collection, sludge transport and water supply, in coordination with response mechanisms led by UNICEF and its partners in shelters.[39]

4. Deploy mobile health services and first aid points within camps in situations where primary health-care services are disrupted or reduced due to security constraints or lack of resources.

5. Strengthen protection mechanisms from exploitation and abuse (PSEA) and refer cases of gender-based violence within shelters and camps, with special attention to persons with disabilities, the elderly, and unaccompanied children.

Second: For Decision Makers (within 0-3 months)

1. Affirm the principle of non-discrimination in access to shelters and public services, and ensure that all those affected – including Palestinian and non-Lebanese refugees – are able to access emergency services in accordance with established humanitarian standards.[40]

2. Take local measures to reduce the exploitation of rents in emergency situations through municipal directives or local organizations where conditions allow, given the emergence of early indications of a rapid rise in rents within areas receiving IDPs, especially in the vicinity of the camps.

Medium-term recommendations

1. Rehabilitation and strengthening of the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure within Palestinian camps, including water networks, sanitation systems, and solid waste management mechanisms, as this system represents one of the most vulnerable structural vulnerabilities in situations of overpopulation and protracted emergencies, which may lead to widespread health and environmental risks if not addressed proactively.

2. Develop and implement a multi-track compensatory education plan aimed at ensuring the continuity of education for children and students affected by displacement, through the adoption of flexible educational alternatives such as temporary schools, a multi-shift system, or digital learning and community-based education solutions, especially in cases where schools are used as shelters or where the educational process is disrupted as a result of security and humanitarian crises.[41]

3. Develop quasi-emergency approaches to support livelihoods within camps and receiving areas for IDPs, including cash-for-work programs linked to service and community activities such as maintenance of WASH facilities, public hygiene work, and light restoration of housing and infrastructure, in order to achieve an integration between humanitarian response and temporary employment opportunities, taking into account the legal and regulatory constraints associated with the work of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

4 . Launch a structured political and human rights dialogue on the structural constraints imposed on Palestinian refugees, particularly in the areas of employment, social security, and housing, as repeated crises and wars reveal that the persistence of these legal restrictions limits the ability of refugee communities to adapt and strengthen their resilience, and in turn, leads to a deepening dependence on humanitarian aid.

Data gaps and monitoring indicators

First: Data Gaps

A review of available data on Palestinian displacement in Lebanon reveals a number of structural gaps in the data, limiting the ability to produce accurate estimates and plan an evidence-based humanitarian response. The most prominent of these gaps can be summarized as follows:

1. The absence of a unified real-time census of displaced Palestinians, distributed by camp or district and type of residence (official shelters, accommodation with relatives, rental housing, or living in the open). The current data are split between UNRWA shelter registrations, unofficial statistics from popular committees, and estimates in press coverage, resulting in a marked discrepancy in the figures circulating.

2. Weak data on the demographic characteristics of displaced Palestinians, particularly with regard to age groups, gender, and disability, as these data are not systematically available, with the exception of some limited local estimates that have emerged in certain cases such as Rashidiya camp.

3. The lack of clarity in the overlap and duplication in the calculation of the numbers of displaced Palestinians between two main categories:

(a) IDPs registered in UNRWA-run shelters

(b) Displaced persons who have moved to camps in northern Lebanon

This overlap makes it possible for some individuals or households to be counted more than once when collecting numbers from different sources.

4. The difficulty of tracking the impact of the interruption or disruption of basic services within the camps – such as primary health care services, waste collection and water supply – on a daily and systematic basis, limits the ability to assess the direct impact of the crisis on health and environmental conditions within the camps.

Second: Proposed Monitoring Indicators

In order to develop an actionable weekly dashboard that will help support rapid assessments and humanitarian response planning, it is proposed to adopt a set of key indicators distributed across a number of vital sectors, as follows:

1. Population and movement

• Number of displaced Palestinian families registered using a Unified Family ID.

The total number of displaced individuals.

• The number of cases of movement or secondary displacement during a seven-day period.

2. Shelter

• Occupancy rate of shelters. (%)

• The proportion of families living in rented accommodation or with relatives compared to families living in shelters or in the open.

 

3. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)

• Average daily water availability hours within the affected camps.

• Number of solid waste removal or sludge transfer interventions.

4. Health

• The number of clinics or health centers operating within the camps.

• The number of emergency medical referrals recorded per week.

5. Education

The number of missing school days for refugee children during the week.

 

 

THE PALESTINIAN ASSOCIATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (WITNESS)

 



[1] Disaster Risk Management Unit. (2026, March 11). Lebanon displacement figures following escalation of hostilities. Lebanese Prime Minister’s Office.

 

[2] United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East. (2026). Situation report: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon during the escalation of hostilities. https://www.unrwa.org

 

[3] Lebanese Ministry of Social Affairs. (2026). Displacement and vulnerability data in southern Lebanon. Internal report.

 

[4] UNRWA. (2026). Situation report: Protection and humanitarian risks for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon during hostilities. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East. https://www.unrwa.org

 

[5] UNRWA.(2026). Situation report: Snapshot of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon — March 14, 2026. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East. https://www.unrwa.org

 

[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2026, March). Flash update: Lebanon displacement and humanitarian situation. https://www.unhcr.org

 

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