Everything is
GONE!
The family of
Abdul Ghani was trapped inside the house for 24 hours during the clashes. They
were forced to flee under the gunfire. The pain was not confined to the loss of
their houses where they lived in for many years, a house full of beautiful
family details, a four-storey house inhabited by nine families. The battle also
made a great steal, it stole their joy of the wedding of their son Ahmed Abdul
Ghani, which was scheduled on Sunday 16 April, 2017, the third day of the
clashes. The house was totally burnt, nothing left of it as a human habitable
home. It was a house for a groom who would soon start his life, everything was
burned with furniture and white clothes he was waiting to wear. Even the feast
he prepared, of meat, nothing left of it, to make joy become sadness, and dream
to a nightmare, which difficult to get rid of easily.
Absence of
the official political reference and the presence of de facto references:
Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon suffer from a very precarious situation that has made the
structure of Palestinian society vulnerable to political and societal diseases.
It was the case of large weakness in the performance of the Palestinian
official reference (PLO political and service institutions), and the status of
legal marginalization, and the state of siege and restrictions imposed by the
Lebanese authorities on the Palestinian refugee camps, as well as the dramatic
decline of UNRWA and its inability –intentionally or unintentionally- to meet
the humanitarian needs of refugees which has had a very negative role in
increasing community-based diseases and creating environments of violence and
extremism that are difficult to deal with easily.
As this tough reality continues, national and
Islamic phenomena have grown, and have been made a matter of fact, dividing the
fractions and weakening every possible force. Cases that claim to be Salafist Islamic movements (with all their
extensions and ideologies) have increased, and the split of the Fateh movement
is further strengthened by the consolidation of the reformist movement. Each of these parts has a reference and
security area that is difficult to bypass.
The de facto
references have grown over the official reference, which is weakened day after
day. The Palestinian factions tried to find a realistic political reference
dealing with all these complexities, but the situation was interrupting its
success, or the time was too late to fix it and ends up with armed violence.
The recent armed clash between the joint force and Bilal Badr group is an obvious
of this weakness.
What
happened in Al Tiri neighborhood?
Al Tiri
neighborhood contains about 440 houses. It has borders: Sirob and Al Nabaa’
road from the east, the main uppermost street from the west, Ras Al Ahmar and
Arab Al Zubaid from the north, and Al Suhoon neighborhood from the south. A
violent clashes broke out in Ain El Helweh camp on April 7, 2017 Friday night,
after the joint force, consisting of Palestinian factions, national and Islamic
forces, tried to execute its orders to these forces in order to deploy and
center on the main pillars inside the camp. These commands were taken to adjust
the security situation and to prevent the violations.
While the
security force has already completed its deployment at most of its designated
points, it deployed to the last point, which is located near the entrance to
the market, close to Blaibel parking and Al-Tiri neighborhood. they was
intercepted by an armed group that belongs Bilal Badr Group, but the joint
force insisted on the implementation of the decision of the political factions
to deploy in the specified place, what made the gunmen of Bilal Badr shoot at
the joint force, and wound several people. Therefore, there were violent
clashes between the joint force (Fateh's majority) and Bilal Badr group, whose
main field is Al-Tiri.
The battle
continued for six consecutive days in which various types of weapons were used,
including rocket-propelled grenades, mortars and anti-aircraft.
On the other
hand, Bilal Badr group, estimated by activists in Ain El-Helweh camp by 30
individuals, managed to confront Fateh movement and move from Al Tiri to other
neighborhoods. This could open another battle in the foreseeable future unless
the Palestinian faction leaders rectify the critical situation.
The battle of
the six days ended with the departure of Bilal Badr and his group from Al-Tiri
neighborhood. He became wanted by the Joint Security Force. This was on the
security and field level, while on the humanitarian level, the results were disastrous.
Mousa
AL Kharbiti…. Bleeding till death:
Mousa Al Kharbiti, a member of "Al
Shaa’b” Party, one of the wounded as a result of the fire on the security force
by Bilal Badr group. Mousa Al Kharbiti has a good reputation, in fact, he was a
resident of al-Tiri, and one of Bilal's neighbors. Kharbiti was bleeding for
three hours, his phone was open and he was in contact with his relatives and
officials at the time he was extremely bleeding. The ambulance and emergency
crews were unable to reach him and save him until he died due to the intensity
of the clashes that broke out in the neighborhood and its vicinity.
Results:
Over the course of two consecutive
days (13 and 14 April 2017), a team from Witness Association conducted field
trips in Ain Al Helwe refugee camp in general, Al-Tiri neighborhood, the area
of clashes and the market in particular, and concluded that:
Human Loss
|
No
|
Name
|
Situation
|
Date
|
|
1
|
Mousa Khaled Ahmad Al Kharbiti
|
Joint Security forces/ Al shaa’b party
|
April 7, 2017
|
|
2
|
Mohammad Ezzat Ibrahim Mousa
|
Fateh Movement
|
April 9, 2017
|
|
3
|
Firas Mohammad Issa Balous
|
Fateh Movement
|
April 9, 2017
|
|
4
|
Abdul Hakim Ahmad Abdul Karim Alaa Addin (Amer Al Khumaini)
|
Fateh Movement
|
April 9, 2017
|
|
5
|
Mamdouh Al Saoui
|
Civilian
|
April 9,2017
|
|
6
|
Mohammad Ramzi Mahmoud Zbeidat
|
Fateh Movement
|
April 10, 2017
|
Structural Loss
|
Type of loss
|
Houses
|
Stores
|
|
Total destruction
|
60
|
16
|
|
Partial destruction
|
180
|
35
|
|
Burning
|
31
|
12
|
|
Total
|
271
|
63
|
Infrastructure:
Infrastructure in the areas of clashes
has been severely affected. According to Witness team and Human Rights reports,
including an ICRC report, the water and electricity networks in at least five
areas has been damaged. For the electricity grid, the main cables and utility
cables that pass through the neighborhood of Al Tiri and feed other
neighborhoods have been severely damaged. The drainage there needs urgent
maintenance because of the huge damage to the water pipes there.
The concept of security
squares replaces national neighborhoods:
One of the most serious consequences
of the Six-Day Battle is that it has enshrined a very dangerous concept, the
concept of security squares. In general, the Palestinian camps are
characterized by the names which refer to the names of Palestinian towns and villages.
These neighborhoods are mostly inhabited by families that are originally from
this village, or the city. In Ain el-Hilweh, for example, there is Saffouriya
neighborhood, Ras al-Ahmar neighborhood, the Taitaba neighborhood, Al-Tiri,
Hittin, Al Safsaf neighborhood, and so on. With the weakness of the official
Palestinian authority and the emergence of existence of real references, each
neighborhood constitutes a security square for an Islamic or national group.
Bilal Badr lived in the Tiri neighborhood, which for him has become a security
square. After the battle, the residents of the Tiri neighborhood, as if they
were all subject to accusation and suspicion by Fateh, found it difficult to
move to other neighborhoods. This happens with the inhabitants of some
neighborhoods as well, where they are provoked by the
forces of this neighborhood or that. The six-day battle will devote this
dangerous concept, unless real reconciliation takes place.
Conclusions and
Recommendations:
1. It is true that there are personal
reasons for the battle of the Six Days, but it is also true that stronger
objective circumstances are the cause of this battle. Life conditions,
marginalization, restrictions, weak official reference, poverty and deprivation
all provide fertile conditions for tension and violence.
2. The battle of the six days, which
took place in Ain El-Hilweh camp, revealed a very dangerous situation,
especially the absence of realistic mentality and the excessive use of force.
3. The Six-Day Battle revealed the
ease of problem-making, the ease of use of weapons, regardless of motives and
the rights of the local population.
4. The Six-Day Battle revealed that
it is difficult to achieve any goal through security treatment without a
comprehensive political decision, without taking all the circumstances of Ain
al-Hilweh camp into consideration, especially the issue of settling the wanted
list, the issue of fighting international terrorism, the issue of the Syrian
crisis and the crisis of the Lebanese internal policies.
Recommendations:
1. We call upon the Lebanese state to
humanize its security procedures, not to harass the inhabitants of the camp and
to give priority to the humanitarian aspects, and to allow the Palestinian
youth and professional qualifications to become more involved in the production
process, and that the intervention of the Lebanese state should be positive.
2. We call on the Lebanese media to
take responsibility and professionalism with the situation of the camps, away
from intimidation, which makes the camps like security hubs and their
inhabitants as if they are wanted for justice.
3. Granting full civil rights to the
Palestinians, as stipulated in the International Bill of Human Rights and other
international instruments, primarily the right to work and ownership, the
formation of associations and the right to have the adequate residence.
4. We call upon all Palestinian
parties not to allow anyone to tamper with the security and stability of the
camp and to support the joint security force in all Palestinian camps.
5. We also call upon the Palestine
Liberation Organization, with its national achievements, to take its real role
in the care of the Palestinian refugees at all levels, especially the political
ones, and to promote their development in the interests of the Palestinians and
their human rights.
6. We call upon UNRWA to increase its
services to meet the needs of the Palestinian refugees, to involve other
international service organizations to provide more support to the Palestinian
refugees and to work with the Lebanese authorities to increase the size of the
camps.
7. We call upon the UNRWA Agency to
establish an emergency fund in case of crisis, away from the traditional
budget, to be used in disaster and security emergencies.
8. Palestinian civil society should
play a more vital role in reconciliation and compensation.